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ABSTRACT 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATICN OF E'IHNIC MINORITIES IN 'IHE 1980s 
currently political participation, especially voter registration and 
turnout, varies substantially with ethnicity. Blacks and non-Hispanic whites 
participate at roughly equal rates, while Latinos and Asian-Americans are 
substantially less active, This variation may reflect cultural factors, or 
it may be the spurious product of differences in the distribution of 
non-ethnic determinants of participation, including socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics, variables reflecting irranigration history, 
including citizenship, and measures of group identification. Using data 
collected in 1984 on sanples of California's black, Latino, Asian-American, 
and non-Hispanic white populations, we conclude that these other variables 
fully account for lower Latino participation rates, Even with such controls, 
however, Asian-Americans remain less likely to vote. Although "on-citizens 
participate less than citizens, they do engage in non-electoral activities, 
Finally, we speculate on the future political impact of Latinos and 
Asian-Americans, by projecting participation rates under several scenarios, 
FOLITICAL PARTICIPATICN OF E'Il!NIC MINORITIES IN 'Il!E 1980s* 
The ccrnbination of recent changes in immigration and differential 
birthrates have significantly altered the ethnic balance in the United 
States. While blacks have remained about twelve percent of the population, 
two other ethnic minorities, Latinos and Asian-Americans, have grown 
dramatically in size. In the fifties, Europeans constituted 59 percent of 
legal immigrants, Latinos, 22 percent, and Asians, 6 percent. Two decades 
later the figures were 18 percent, 41 percent, and 36 percent, respectively. 
While non-Hispanic white women average 1 . 7  births each, the birthrate for 
Latinas is 2.8 and for black women is 2. 3. The population shifts have been 
concentrated in large, politically corrpetitive states, such as Texas, 
Florida, Illinois, and especially California. In fact, the California 
population is expected to be less than half non-Hispanic white by the year 
2010, after having dropped from 87 percent non-Hispanic white in 1960 to 67 
percent in 1980, 
The increase in minority populations could prove to be politically 
important, However, for political effects to appear, two conditions must 
hold: first, the minority populations must have distinctive political vi�ws, 
and, second, they must participate in politics so that their views make an 
impact, In this paper we address the second of these issues and examine the 
current and anticipated levels of political participation by members of 
ethnic minority groups.1 Before proceeding, we note that whether or not
members of these groups hold distinctive views, the level of their political 
participation indicates the degree of their integration into the American 
polity. 
There does exist an extensive literature on black-white differences in 
political activity (e. g. Matthews and Prothro, 1966; Orum, 1966; Olsen, 1970; 
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Verba and Nie, 1972; London and Hearn, 1977; Danigelis, 1978; Shingles, 1981; 
Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk, 1981; Welch and Secret, 1981; Brown, 
Jackson, and Bowman, 1982; Miller, 1982; Danigelis, 1982; Guterbock and 
London, 1983) and a growing literature on Latino political participation 
(Welch, comer, And Steinman, 1975; Antunes and Gaitz, 1975; Tavlik, 1976; 
Loverich and Marenin, 1976; Welch, 1977; Guzman, 1976; Buehler, 1977; 
Rodriguez, 1978; MacManus and Cassel, 1982; Brischetto and de la Garza, 1983; 
de la Garza and Weaver, 1984). With important exceptions (Kitano, 1969), 
much less is known about Asian-American political participation, Large 
national surveys have not been very helpful in this regard because they 
usually include few Latinos and even fewer Asian-Americans (de la Garza, 
1987).2 Most of the studies that have been done of non-black ethnic 
minorities have been restricted to a single group and often are based on a 
local sample, Few (e. g. , Antunes and Gaitz, 1975; Loverich and Marenin, 
1976) make comparisons across ethnic minority groups. The present study is 
based upon survey interviews conducted in late 1984 with samples of blacks, 
Latinos, Asian-Americans, and non-Hispanic whites. It thus allows for 
comparisons among all major ethnic groups and thereby makes an important 
contribution to the present state of knowledge of ethnic patterns of 
political participation in the United States, 
Another important contribution of this study is to examine the political 
behavior of non-citizens, Even before attaining citizenship, non-citizens 
may participate in the political process in various ways. Indeed, under the 
one-person, one-vote court rulings they are considered equal to citizens in 
the apportionment of legislative districts. Moreover, under the amnesty 
provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, several million 
more non-citizens, primarily of Latino descent, are expected to begin the 
process of attaining citizenship by becoming legal alien residents. over 
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half of these persons are thought to reside in California. Non-citizens 
conprise an important yet little-studied pool of current, and potential, 
participants, 
Outside the realm of practical politics, the theoretical debates on the 
determinants of political participation pose a number of questions which can 
be addressed by examining the behavior of ethnic populations. over and above 
the correlation between socioeconomic resources and participation, various 
forms of group affiliation can increase activity, Race and ethnicity have 
historically been important sources of group organization in conterrporary 
America -- does the same apply to the newer immigrant groups? 
Finally, these various ethnic groups appear to be culturally distinctive, 
and the recent immigrants among them come from varied political systems. To 
the extent that these differences carry over into American experience, they 
may contribute to differences in political activity among the groups. 
Both the practical and 'the theoretical perspectives lead us to ask 
certain questions about the political participation of various minority 
groups. First, how active are members of various ethnic and racial groups in 
different forms of political participation? Secondly, do differences between 
the groups simply reflect socioeconomic differences, or does ethnicity it£elf 
matter? Thirdly, do we see any signs of group-based mobilization? Finally, 
how much activity might one expect to see in the future under different 
scenarios of deflDgraphic and political change, and in light of the behavior 
of non-citizens? 
The deT1D9raphic changes have been most dramatic in California, making 
California a good site for the study of minorities. To answer the questions 
posed above, this paper draws upon a California-wide survey of 574 Latinos, 
335 blacks, 308 Asian-Americans, and 317 non-Hispanic whites. (For ease of 
exposition, in the remainder of the text we will refer sinply to "whites" 
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when we mean "non-Hispanic whites," to "Asians" when we mean 
"Asian-Americans," to "Japanese" for "Japanese-Americans," and so forth. See 
Appendix B for more detail on the sampling design and sample.3) We 
consider a range of participatory activities. Registering and voting have 
the most direct electoral consequences, but various campaign activities, the 
contacting of officials, the direct transmission of opinions to news media, 
and community action may indirectly affect elections and, perhaps more 
important, may influence the opinions of others and affect policy.4 
We first examine the level of political activity across the different 
ethnic groups. Then we sketch the theoretical framework which shapes our 
central analysis, the examination of the determinants of participation levels 
among citizens and non-citizens. Finally, we use the estimated models to 
forecast participation rates under several alternative scenarios of the 
future. 
LEVEIS OF roLITICAL PARI'ICIPATION WITIUN E'IBNIC GRaJPS 
Studies of black participation have shown that blacks currently 
participate at levels very near those of whites; for at least twenty years 
the rates of black activity have been virtually the same as whites, or 
higher, once income and education are controlled (Verba and Nie, 1972; Olsen, 
1970). Most studies of Latinos and Asian-Americans conclude that they 
participate less often than members of the r.ajority population. For example, 
self-reported turnout was twenty percent less for Mexican-Americans in the 
1984 National Election Study than it was for non-Hispanic whites. Our data 
are consistent with these general conclusions. 
Table 1 reports the percentages participating. It shows that the ethnic 
groups differ substantially from each other �n the percentage of people 
engaging in various political activities. Overall, the predominantly 
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native-born groups -- blacks and whites � are more politically active than 
Latinos and Asians. 
TABLE l ABOOT HERE 
The differences across groups are particularly striking for registration and 
voting. Corrpared with blacks and whites, less than two-thirds as many 
Latinos and Asians reported they were registered to vote or voted.5 
Once we take account of the disparities between the racial and ethnic 
groups in the proportion of their members who are citizens, the differences 
in participation rates diminish substantially.6 The second and fourth rows 
of Table 1 indicate that the registration and voting rates for Latino and 
Asian citizens come much closer to those for whites and blacks. Moreover, 
restricting attention to citizens brings white rates nearer to the black 
level. 
For registration and voting, lack of citizenship constitutes an absolute 
bar to participation. Although non-citizens are legally eligible to 
participate in most of the other forms of political activities in Table 1 
(with the exception of political contributions) , we might reasonably expect 
non-citizens to be less likely to do so. We thus report separately the , 
percentages in each group who are active for citizens, for non-citizens, and 
for the total sample. Consider the next four activities, all of which are 
some form of campaign participation (i, e., contributing money, exhibiting a 
campaign poster or sticker, working for a party o.
r candidate, and attending a 
political meeting or rally) . Virtually identical proportions of whites and 
blacks report having done these things, while Latinos and Asians say they are 
less active. When we separate citizens from non-citizens, we find that some 
non-citizens do participate politically, and that the Latino and Asian 
citizens are almost as active as whites and blacks. 
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The next three items concern various types of non-electoral activity. 
The rough parity between white and black participation breaks down when it 
comes to contacting elected officials, with whites clearly more likely to do 
so than blacks. This result is consistent with Verba and Nie's finding 
(1972, pp. 160-170) that blacks contact officials less than whites, even with 
controls for group consciousness and social class. On the other hand, blacks 
in our sample are slightly more likely than whites to say that they have 
worked with a community group to solve a problem. 
As with the electoral activities, controlling for citizenship of Latinos 
and Asians greatly reduces the disparity between their activity rates and 
those of whites a�d blacks. Latino and Asian citizens are about equally 
likely to contact elected officials and do so less than whites; this 
similarity among all three groups of ethnic minorities is consistent with 
Verba and Nie's explanation of their results for blacks. Latino and Asian 
citizens differ on the last two items; Latino citizens are less likely than 
blacks or whites to work in groups but contact news media at about the same 
rate as they do while Asian citizens are as likely as whites to work in 
groups and more likely than anyone to convey opinions to news media. 
Although non-citizens are more active than one might expect � one-tenth to 
one-fifth of them take part in these activities -- they are still much less 
active than citizens (see also Brischetto and de la Garza, 1983) . 
To check our impression that there is a first-order relationship between 
ethnicity and participation even after allowing for differential rates of 
citizenship, we ran estimations of the various participation variables on 
dummy variables for ethnicity, among citizens only, Because of the 
dichotomous nature of the dependent variables, probit analysis was used to 
estimate this model. (In these and later estimations we omit the three 
campaign activities other than contributing money due to the low frequency 
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of activity.) These results are reported in Table 2. The top number in each 
entry is the maximum likelihood estimate, the bottom number the standard 
error. Dividing the estimate by the standard error yields the associated 
t-statistic. All of the ethnic minority groups contact officials less than 
whites, while there are no differences for contacting media. For all of the 
other activities, blacks and whites participate at the same rate, while 
Latinos participate less. Although Asians participate in some activities as 
much as whites ( contacting media and contributing money), on the whole they 
are less active. 
TABLE 2 ABaJT HERE 
Finally, one might object to grouping all of the Asian respondents into a 
single category. The Asian sarrple includes approximately equal numbers of 
respondents of Filipino, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean descent, with a 
scattering of Vietnamese-Americans and others. We recognize that these 
groups do not think of themselves as a single "Asian" ethnicity. To see 
whether their participation rates differ substantially from each other, we 
repeated the estimation on ethnic dummies breaking the Asian category down 
into the groups above (with the Vietnamese-Americans grouped with anyone oot 
otherwise classified). We do find some differences by nationality. (See 
Appendix Table A.l for the coefficients.) The data suggest that the 
Japanese, Koreans, and Filipinos are all less likely to register and to vote 
than whites, while the Chinese are much nearer to whites in their turnout 
pattern. Japanese are slightly more likely to contribute money than whites, 
while Filipinos (and perhaps the Other Asian-Americans) are more likely to 
contact news media,7 All of the Asian groups are less likely to contact 
officials than are whites. An apparent surprise is the low coefficient, 
indicating low participation, for the Japanese on every activity except 
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contributing money. The Japanese-Americans are economically successful and 
in many respects highly assimilated into American life (Kitano, 1969). 
If we had sufficient cases, we would like to carry through the analysis 
separately for the various Asian groups. Since we do not have many cases in 
each separate category, we emphasize that these results are at best 
suggestive. Beyond statistical necessity, however, we believe there is some 
justification for aggregating these respondents into a single Asian 
category. First, the cultural differences between Asian-Americans on the 
basis of nationality are still relatively small compared to those between 
native-born and immigrant individuals and between Asian immigrants and those 
from Latin America. Second, the political environment may be placing 
pressure on these individuals to think of themselves as "Asian" in a similar 
fashion to the way Sicilians, Neapolitans, and Florentines became "Italian" 
in the United States. We think enough can be learned from analysis of the 
Asians as an aggregated category to proceed. 
we have seen that there are differences across groups in amount of 
political participation. Most notably, Latinos and Asians participate less 
in politics than do whites or blacks even when we restrict attention to 
American citizens. We do not yet know, however, whether these differences 
are related to ethnicity in any meaningful way, or whether instead they are 
the spurious product of differences in the distribution of non-ethnic 
determinants of participation. These determinants include demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics such as age, educat_ion, and birth abroad. In 
addition, we suspect that the levels of activity reflect varying levels of 
group identification or group mobilization. These questions will be 
addressed by developing and estimating a fuller model of political 
participation. 
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PCLITICAL PARTICIPATION: PREVIOOS 'IllEORY AND RESEARCH 
A large body of previous research has repeatedly shown that political 
participation is positively associated with several related demographic and 
economic variables. These variables have been hypothesized to influence 
decisions regarding participation in several different ways. Some theorists 
see them as factors which reduce the informational and other costs of 
participation or increase the stakes of acting. Other theorists enphasize 
psychological payoffs (e.g., satisfying a sense of civic duty) correlated 
with these factors. These variables have also been viewed as indicating the 
level of resources (money, knowledge, free time, etc.) which a person can 
spend on political activity.8 In short, interpretations given for why 
people participate in politics vary considerably more than how the 
determinants are operationalized.9 
Whatever one's theoretical predilections, a central task in our analysis 
is to determine how much of the observed variation,in participation among 
major ethnic groups can be accounted for by variation in background 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. Our survey thus included 
several questions about respondents' socioeconomic characteristics. Chie� 
among these variables are education and income (Conway, 1985; Carrpbell, 
et.al., 1960; Verba and Nie, 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980) . 
Previous studies have sho�m that these factors can account for significant 
differences in minority and white participation rates (Antunes and Gaitz, 
1975; Brischetto and de la Garza, 1983; Buehler, 1977) . Respondents are, 
however, often reticent about reporting income; in this survey 17 percent 
declined to answer the family income question. For purposes of this 
analysis we therefore used responses to three other questions which reveal 
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differences in financial well-being: whether the respondent's family owned 
or rented their home, whether or not the head of the respondent's household 
had been unemployed in the previous year, and whether or not the respondent 
was a single mother. Unemployment has been found to depress turnout in 
congressional elections (Rosenstone, 1982) , although others argue the effect 
of unemployment is spurious (Schlozman and Verba, 1979) . Being a single 
mother, of course, probably is indicative of lacking free time as well as 
income, 
We also ascertained respondents' age and gender. Older people have 
consistently been found to be more active politically, although there 
appears to be a slight drop-off in activity among the very elderly. The 
usual explanations suggest that as people get older, they get into the habit 
of political activity, or that experience reduces the costs, or that their 
stakes in the outcomes increase along with their increasing wealth, 
property, and families. The very old, however, confront new costs in the 
form of difficulties getting around. Although gender differences in 
participation appear to have largely disappeared in recent years, results 
from earlier studies often found women participated less than men. It is 
also possible that even if gender differences have declined in the overall 
population, such differences may persisted in some minority group 
populations. 
Several other factors which affect a potential participant's resources 
are especially important in analyzing heavily immigrant populations. Not 
speaking English as a primary language inhibits the acquisition of 
information and increases the difficulty of certain activities. For those 
born abroad, longer residence in the United States corresponds to greater 
opportunities for inexpensive acquisition of political information. In 
addition, speaking English and living in the U.S. for a greater percentage 
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of one's life may indirectly measure a greater degree of integration into 
mainstream American society, 
The distribution of these variables across ethnic groups is reported in 
Table 3. As the figures in this table indicate, Latino citizens are a 
TABLE 3 ABOOT HERE 
relatively younger, less well educated population. Latino participation 
rates could also be depressed by incomplete integration into the American 
mainstream; approximately one out of seven Latinos in our sample had been 
born outside of the United states, and over 40 percent retained Spanish as 
their primary language. 
The data on Asians, in contrast, pose something of a puzzle. Their 
relatively low rates of participation in various political activities are all 
the more remarkable in light of their high levels of employment, educational 
attainment, and homeownership, and extremely low number of single mothers. 
Perhaps, in the case of Asians, the effects associated with these variables, 
which we would expect to be positive, are swamped by the presumably dampening 
effects of being born abroad (47 percent of the Asian citizens in our survey 
were irrunigrants) or poor English skills. In short, the figures in Table 3 
pose more questions than they answer. A multivariate analysis may shed some 
light on these matters. 
The.second major ccrnponent in our analysis considers the effects of an 
explicit sense of group identification upon ethnic minority political participation. 
such effects could compensate for a lack of socioeconomic resources, (as in 
the case of Latinos or blacks) or detract from them (as is perhaps the case 
for Asians) . A number of researchers have pointed to the role of "group 
consciousness". in increasing activity (Miller et al., 1981; Verba and Nie, 
1972) . Others find effects associated with membership in particular cleavage 
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groups, such as different religions, in the Netherlands, or class/religious 
groupings, in Austria (Verba, Nie, and Kirn, 1978) . In both i nstances the 
groups in question are politically meaningful (members are presumed to share 
some significant preferences or to be treated as though they did) , and the 
group resources are hypothesized to substitute for individual resources. In 
addition, a number of studies show that membership and activity in 
organizations increase activity (Lipset, 1960; Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, 
1969; Verba and Nie, 1972) although this effect likely reflects the learning 
of transferable skills and attitudes. Group effects, especially those based 
on the political role of the group, may help explain political mobilization 
of ethnic minorities (Welch, 1977; Pavlik, 1976; Miller et al., 1981; Brown, 
Jackson, and Bowman, 1982; Jackson, 1987) . 
However, this research has not accounted precisely for the link between 
group interest or group identity and the individual's motive to act. 
Rational actor theories, on the other hand, provide the possibility of 
linking group interests and individual action. These theories posit that 
people act if the benefits of action are greater than the costs. If people 
are assumed to be expected utility maximizers, the benefit of one candidate 
winning rather than another is discounted by the (low) probability that an 
individual's action will alter an outcome (e.g. his or her vote change an 
election winner) . It follows that in a mass election few people would vote 
(Downs, 1957) . The problem has the same form as the general collective 
action problem (Olson, 1971); namely, when members of large groups each 
derive only a small benefit from some collective endeavor, group action is 
liable to founder on the free-rider problem. Consumption goods (roughly 
equivalent to selective incentives in Olson's terminology) are often proposed 
to solve the problem of predicted levels of activity far below observed 
amounts (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968) , but Barry (1970) and others argue 
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that this solution amounts to throwing away the politics in political 
activity.10 
Whatever the case, we concur that the low odds of an individual being 
pivotal to a political outccme imply that instrumental benefits, including 
perception of a group interest, will rarely outweigh the costs of action. 
Thus consurrption benefits will usually be needed to produce action. We 
outline here another approach, based upon the observation that an important 
subset of the consurrption goods look like instrumental benefits and perform 
like them within the larger political system.11 These consumption goods 
depend upon the existence both of group affiliations, such as ethnic 
identities, and of group-specific leaders.1
2 
Although the vote of one 
Latino has little influence on an election, both a candidate and a Latino 
leader can see a non-negligible effect on the probability of winning from a 
several percent increase in Latino turnout. Intermediary elites can increase 
turnout by increasing the consurrption benefits of action to their members. 
They will invest resources to do so if the candidate provides enough benefits 
(policy positions or patronage) in exchange for more support. Thus, the 
consumption benefits that at the margin bring an individual to act rest upon 
political trades and promises, instead of simply reflecting early 
socialization. The net result is that participators motivated by consumption 
benefits may appear to act out of instrumental motivations, and may in fact 
ultimately receive instrumental payoffs for their actions. As members of 
minority groups see their ethnicity as more salient to their identity and see 
politics as more salient to the group, and if there exists a set of leaders 
identified with the group, one would expect participation to increase, 
Our data provide what we believe to be a useful indicator of group 
consciousness.13 After being asked what they believed to be the most 
irrportant problem facing people in this country today, respondents were then 
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asked to name problems which they felt were of special concern to members of 
their racial or ethnic group. Persons who named such a problem, we argue, 
are conscious of their ethnic group as a politically salient identity 
connected to a common political interest. 
An additional conponent of an analysis of the impact of group 
identification upon participation decisions is the existence of corrpeting 
loyalties. A Catholic Latino working on an assembly line, for instance, 
might not be naturally inclined to give ethnic interests precedence over 
occupational or religious ones, Political leadership can enhance a sense of 
group loyalties. This is essentially what many partisan (e.g., elected 
officials) and nonpartisan (e.g., the Southwest Voter Registration Drive) 
minority leaders have attempted to do in recent years. Issues before the 
legislature can facilitate this process. The prospect of immigration reform, 
for exanple, probably heightened the salience of group identity among many 
Latinos in recent years.14 
To realistically gauge the impact of ethnic group identification we must 
also gauge the influence of other, possibly corrpeting, group loyalties. We 
therefore asked respondents whether there was some other group, in addition 
to a racial or nationality group, that they felt part of, and that makes them 
more concerned about certain problems. In Table 4 we report the percentage 
of each ethnic group, citizens and noncitizens, who said that there were 
problems of special concern to people of their racial or national background, 
and also the percentage of each group who named a_ second, non-ethnic 
identity. These figures indicate that two out of three blacks and nearly 
half the Latino citizens reported a problem which they felt was particularly 
troublesome for people of their race or ethnicity, The actual problems they 
mentioned, furthermore, appeared to reflect the circumstances of their 
respective groups. The vast majority of blacks referred to either 
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unerrployment, discrimination, crime, or drug abuse. Latinos, on the other 
hand, were especially likely to refer to the need for more and better 
education. Far fewer respondents named a second, non-ethnic identity which 
makes them more concerned about particular problems. Whites were most likely 
to do so, while Latinos and Asians were least likely. 
Aside from the question of the relative effect of ethnic and non-ethnic 
identifications, both of these measures of group-identity correspond to bases 
for political mobilization, as described above. To the extent that either 
measure is related to participation, we believe there is some indication of 
group-based activity. If the ethnic-identity measure functions this way, 
then there is evidence for an ethnic effect via ethnic group mobilization. 
TABLE 4 AProT HERE 
Finally, we consider the interpretation of any effects associated with 
ethnicity which cannot be accounted for by either our battery of exogenous 
socioeconomic and demographic variables or by our indicators of group 
consciousness. Although the significant amount of measurement error which 
are associated with survey research may well be the source of such residue, 
we feel that it is inportant to consider additional culture-based 
explanations. Almond and Verba (1963), for instance, found that varying 
proportions of citizens in the five nations they studied had either 
"parochial," "subject," or "participant" orientations, with each orientation 
associated with a corrplex of beliefs and a specific level of political 
activity. Latino immigrants come from polities with more "parochials," and 
may therefore be less active (see also, Buehler, 1977). A cost-benefit 
argument leads to a similar prediction; many Asian and Latino immigrants come 
from countries with a single dominant party where elections produce little 
party alternation. (See McDonough, 1971, on effects of party corrpetition.) 
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Additionally, there have been suggestions of variations in cultural norms 
with respect to integration into the larger society (Kitano, 1969). In the 
analysis to follow we do not explicitly investigate culturally derived 
attitudes which might be associated with different levels of participation. 
However, we do allow for the presence of residual cultural differences by 
retaining the ethnic group dunrny variables in the equations we estimate. 
EsrIWITION 
The previous discussion of the common factors associated with political 
participation leads us to propose estimating a model of the following form: 
where 
Pr[Y=l] = F[X,G,Z] 
X is a vector of the individual characteristics, including age, 
education, homeownership, which were reported in Table 3. These 
variables all enter the equation as [1,0] dummies except for age and 
for the percentage of his or lifetime that the respondent had 
spent in the u.s. 
G is a pair of variables indicating group identifications, either 
ethnic or nonethnic, as reported in Table 4. These variables 
also enter the equation as dummies which take on the value of 
1 if the respondent named a problem of special concern to 
his or her group, O otherwise. 
Z is a vector of ethnicity variables coded as [l,O] dummies. These 
variables had been included in the previous analysis reported 
in Table 2. 
Y is a.vector of political activities coded as [l,O] dummies. 
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As before, this model is estimated with probit analysis.  Results a re 
reported in Table 5 .  The various demographic variables perform pretty much 
as expected . Older people are generally more active , except for the very old 
who are less so. Activity is higher among the college-educated and those who 
own homes , 15 Single mothers vote less and are less likely to contribute
money, while livi ng in a household wit h  an unemployed head has a negative, 
although statistically i nsignificant , effect. we do find a gender difference 
for two forms of pa rticipation ; men are more likely to contribute money and 
to say they have worked in a canmunity group . 
TABLE 5 ABO\Jr HERE 
The irrrnigration-linked indicators also behave as expected. The g reater 
the percentage of one ' s  life spent outside the United States, the lower the 
likelihood of participating {except for a small effect in the other direction 
for contributing money). Even controlling for that percentage , persons who 
do not use English as their primary language are less active . 
Both the measure of ethnic identity and that of non-ethnic group identity 
are positively related to all activities except voting . Naming an 
ethnic-group related problem or having a non-ethnic identity is related to 
registration; actually going to the polls entails something else . That the 
ethnic problem measure of group identity is positively related to activity 
suggests that there may be some mobilization on ethnic lines . That the 
non-ethnic identity va riable matters suggests that other groui:r-related 
phenomena also matter .  
we are cautious about inferring di rection of causality for some of our 
participation i tems . One might plausibly argue that persons who choose to 
work in a canmunity group might as a consequence develop more awareness of 
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ethnic-group related problems. That a relationship exists is clea r ;  we think 
it plausible that the causality often runs from the group-identity to 
participation instead of the reverse . 
Does ethnicity still matter after controlling for other factors? With 
some qualifications, the answer is that the significance of the ethnic 
intercept disappears for Latinos, while the Asian-American ethnic intercept
remains significan t .  Except for contacting officials, which retains a 
negative coefficient for all of the minority ethnic groups, once we control 
for the factors discussed above , no effect remains for a "Latino" variable. 
That is, the lower levels of participation we observed for Latinos can be 
explained by the other variables in our probit estimation. Thus, we conclude 
that no residual cultural factor is needed to explain Latinos ' lower levels 
of participation; the set of demographic and group identity variables 
suffices , 
The Asians , however ,  present a different picture. Even after all of the 
controls above , they remain less likely than whites to register ,  vot e ,  and 
contact elected officials. In fact, since they are relatively high on the 
various socio-economic variables, the controls do little to reduce the 
disparity between them and the other groups . To further explore their 
situation, we repeated the estimation splitting the Asians into nationality 
groups, as before . {The coefficients are reported in Appendix Table A . 2 )  
Again, in light of the few cases i n  each category, these results are at best 
suggestive . The Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans are among the less likely to 
contact officials. The Filipinos and Other Asian-Americans are somewhat more 
likely than whites to make their opinions known t hrough the news media, 
balancing out a statistically insignificant negative effect in the other 
groups. 
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With respect to voting and registration, the data indicate that it i s  
Japanese w ho  a r e  particularly unlikely to register and to vote, with some of 
the same effect among Filipinos. Let us be clear on what this finding 
means. The negative effect among Japanese is accentuated by our demographic 
controls, since they are high on these independent variables. our finding i s  
consistent with Kitano' s: "If we use knowledge of political issues, active 
participation in political organizations, and the like as criteria • • the 
Japanese American , at least at this stage of his acculturation, i s  an 
apolitical population . "  ( Kitano, 196 9 ,  p .  138) . The result suggests that the 
lc:Mer electoral participation rates observed among Asians will not simply go 
away as a result of economic advances and length of time in the United 
States. A full explanation requires i n-depth examination of the role of 
electoral politics within' these communities. 
The results reported above for Latinos, on t he  other hand, suggest that 
their case resembles that of blacks. Namely, once'one conpares persons of 
similar socioeconomic position, differences in participation evaporate 
( again, parallel to blacks, with the exception of contacting officials ) .  Of 
course , in the case of Latinos , unlike that of blacks, speaking English afld 
having been in the United States for a while also increase participation . 
Thus , citi zens are more active as they are older ,  but not too old , better 
educated ,  better off, and longer resident in the u.s. 16 Ethnicity matters
after controlling for demographics and for group consciousness for Asians but 
not for Latinos . Ethnicity matters for all of the minority groups as a basis 
for mobilization, as captured in the "ethnic problem" measure of group 
consciousness . 
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WHO ARE 'lllE PARTICI.PATIN'.> NON-CITIZENS? 
As our sanple contains 261 non-citizens, it provides a unique opportunity 
to examine thei r behavior . Non-citi zens do participate, especially in 
activities in which they directly present thei r views or work on some issue. 
What d ifferentiates the active non-citi zens from those who do not take part 
in American politics? 
we used a slightly different model to examine this question than we used 
for citizen participation. Some variables we omitted sinply because there 
was little variance ( for i nstance, only 15 of the non-citizens were single 
mothers, and about the same number mentioned a non-ethnic identity; even 
fewer are older than 65 ) .  The main variable we added was one intended to 
capture the extent to which these individuals had commitments to their 
country of origin. Non-citizens were coded one on this dunrny variable if 
they have social links to their country of origin, or send money there, or 
have considered going back there to live ( as opposed to being pretty sure 
they will always live in the United States) .  Finally, since all of these 
respondents were born outside of the United states, we reversed the variable 
on the percentage of time spent abroad so that it now reflects the percentage 
of their life which they have lived in the United States. 
Because non-citizens are barred by law f rom registeri ng ,  voting, and 
contributing money, we estimate the models only for working in groups, 
contacting officials, and contacting news media .  
TABLE 6 A BCUI'  H ERE  
Table 6 reports the results o f  the estimations. A number of the standard 
socioeconomic variables are not especially significant, although the signs go 
i n  the appropriate directions. The most interesti ng ,  and most consistent, 
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effect comes from the variable measuring percentage of life spent in the 
United states. The greater the proportion of his or her life a non-citizen 
has spent i n  the United states ,  the more likely he or she is to take part in 
one of these activities. This conclusion holds especially for working in 
groups and contacting news media; the effect is much smaller for contacting 
elected officials . Once length of stay in the country i s  controlled, 
language has an additional effect only for contacting news media; non-English 
speakers are less l ikely to do so. 
Non-citizens who believe that they do have a problem related to their 
ethnicity a re clearly more li kely to report having worked in a community 
group to solve a problem. We can i nterpret this finding two ways : 
non-ci tizens are active if they have group consciousness or if they have 
interests to pursue, or both. Non-citizens with ethnic problems are also 
more li kely to contact officials; again, either interpretation could hold . 
Those non-citi zens who are linked to their country of origin, in the ways 
discussed above, a re less likely to express their views to news medi a .
Finally , and i n  contrast to citizens ,  older non-citizens are less likely 
to contact either the media or officials than are younger ones. Note that 
age is not simply picking up cohort differences in language or education, as 
we control for those variables explicitly. In addition, we control for 
percentage of life spent in the u.s. We speculate that the age result
beha . 17 reflects a greater willingness by young people to try out new v1ors . 
overall, it appears that non-citizens participate in part for the same 
reasons as citi zens. Beyond that, though, non-citizens appear to be more 
active as they perceive that they have g roup-specific problems in need of 
solution, as they have been residents longer ,  as they are less c losely linked 
to the i r  country of origin, and as they are younger . 
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PROJOCTICNS OF FurCTRE PARl'ICIPATICl'I RATES 
Finally, what levels of participation might we expect to see in the 
future? Social scientists are notoriously poor prognosticators; however ,  
our estimations allow us t o  suggest what activity levels might look like 
under several different scenarios. We are particularly interested in what 
may happen to registration, to voting rates, to the likelihood of contacting 
elected officials, and to working in groups . 
The f i rst scenario we label "Americanization;" if the flow of 
immigration were to stop, the Latino and Asian populations would become 
older ,  would have resided longer on average in the United states, and would 
contain fewer non-English speakers and non-native born. We assume that 
socioeconomic levels do not shift. In our second scenario, "Party 
Recruitment ," we assume that nothing changes except that the parties work 
hard and engender loyalty among Asians and Latinos . The demographic factors 
we assume remain the same; a continued flow of immigration has kept the 
numbers of new arrivals and non-English speakers up, and social mobility has 
not increased . Consider ,  next, the possibility that socio-economic mobility 
occurs without assimilation; the minorities enjoy upward economic and 
educational mobility while remaining young and non-English speaking ( for 
example, by developing a successful parallel economy with continuing 
immigration flows ) . Under our fourth scenario we assume that the demographic 
changes of Americanization occur as well as the party recruitment of the 
second scenario , but despite these changes economic and educational mobility 
are blocked. Finally, we consider the possibility that assimilation works; 
all the elements of the Americanization scenario take place and in addition 
the minorities experience upward economic and educational mobility, Under 
this scena rio, parties a re assumed not to be any more active than currently. 
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We enphasi ze that our projections are a ceteris 1?3.rabus exercise; all of 
our projections depend upon the restrictive assunption that the coefficients 
in the estimation remain unchanged in the face of these transformations. 
Some of them are in fact l ikely to change. For instance, under the 
Americanization scenario, if the numbers of non- English speakers dropped 
radically, a similar estimation might well yield a different coefficient for 
that variable. 
We begin by looking at citizens only. Because we think parties could be 
inportant agents of change ,  we re-estimated our equations including dummy 
variables for strong and weak party identifiers ( reported i n  Appendix Table 
A , 3 ) , We used the coefficents to construct projections as follows, For most 
of the independent variables, we used whites as a reference g roup; for 
percentage of strong partisans blacks defined the reference category. Then, 
for each other group we calculated the difference between their mean score on 
the variable and that of the reference group . we multiplied these 
differences by the probit coefficient . The result'tells us how far along t he 
normal density function that much of a shift in the independent variable 
would take the group . The corresponding increase in area under the curve 
corresponds to the additional percentage of group members who would take part 
in the activity, under our assunptions . The magnitude of the increase in 
proportion depends upon where we start on the curve; for each group, that 
will be the position corresponding to their current activity rate. 18
TABLE 7 AB:XJT HERE 
Table 7 summa rizes our projections. We did not calculate projections for 
Asians under scenarios III or V as their mean education and mean score on the 
income indicators a re already above those of the white sample .  We did 
consider what might happen to white participation if partisanship were to 
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increase, and we considered how a change in the age structure ( under I )  or an 
increase in socioeconomic level ( scenario I I I )  would alter black activity. 
Our projections show, first, that scenario I, Americanization, would be 
sufficient to bring Latino electoral participation rates close to those of 
blacks and whites; the addition of either stronger partisanship or 
socioeconomic advances, vi rtually wipes out the remaining differences • .  The 
same scenarios bring the rate of contacting officials up to the black rate , 
and then beyond i t .  Either Americanization o r  socioeconomic mobility 
increases the probability of working in groups; the combination of the two in 
the fifth scenario brings these rates to white levels. Among Asian s ,  either 
the Americanization scenario or an increase in partisanship brings 
registration rates up to black and white levels; ccmbining the two brings 
registration beyond white and black rates and voting up to that level.  The 
Americanization scenario brings contacting and working in groups up past 
black levels. 
Of course , the world does not change suddenly, and the p roportion of 
non- English speakers will not instantaneously drop to zero. However, these 
projections lead us to believe that either normal demographic processes or 
the politicization of these electorates would be sufficient to raise 
participation rates substantially. 
COOCLUSICN 
The rise in numbers of non-black minority groups in the United States has 
led to speculation about possible changes in American politic s .  Some foresee 
a "Rainbow Coalition , "  whether or not led by Jesse Jackson; others anticipate 
advantages for the Democrats, still others for the Republicans; some seers 
predict policy shifts of various kinds. A precondition for any of these 
changes to occur is that the members of these groups take part in politics. 
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We began this paper by establishing that Latinos and Asian-Americans do, in 
fact, participate less in politics than do non-Hispanic whites or blacks. 
One factor irrportant in this d ifference i s  the large proportion of Latinos 
and Asian-Americans who are not citizens; since these people are not eligible 
to vote , inclusion of them in the base for calculating turnout provides a 
misleadi ng  impression of the activity of the eligibles . Howeve r ,  even 
restricting attention to citi zens, Latinos and Asian-Americans register and 
vote at lower rates than whites and blacks. 
This difference in activity could be due to cultural factors, such as a 
caranunity norm to avoid political involvement, or a learned attitude that 
electoral politics are a waste of time. On the other hand, the difference in 
activity could be spuriously related to ethnicity and instead reflect 
differences across groups in the distribution of other characteristics which 
lead to participation. In the latter case, one could expect political 
activity to increase naturally as the distribution of these characteristics 
became more favorable. In the former case, the differences in activity would 
persist, until and unless assimilation occurred or the norms of the community 
changed ; neither of these contingencies can be expected to occur as a matter 
of course .  
The analysis showed that the Asian-Americans f i t  the non-spurious case; 
even with the controls, Asian-Americans are less active. We do not believe 
that one can simply offer "culture" as an explanationi clearly we would like 
to know what it is about being Asian-American that depresses political 
activity. What we can say is that whatever i t  is ccmes from outside of this 
set of determinants of activity. Unti l  we know what this effect comes from, 
it seems likely that the linear extrapolation i nvolved in our projections 
most li kely yields predictions that are too high. 
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Latinos, on the other hand, fit the spurious relationship case; 
controlling for demographic and related determinants of activity wipes out 
the effect of Latino ethnicity, confirming the results of Antunes and Gaitz 
(1975) .  In the case of Latinos , then, our projections have some 
plausibility. If the population ages aha becomes more native born, more
English speaking ,  if its education and inccme level increases ,  then we do 
expect to see substantial increases in activity. Ethnicity� se has no 
independent effect .  
Group consciousness does, however ,  matter , for activities other than 
voting . Persons who believe that thei r ethnic group has specific problems, 
as well as those who have some non-ethnic group identity, are more likely to 
give money, to contact, or to work in groups. Ethnicity may provide a basis 
for the mobilization of activity. In this sense, ethnicity does matter . 
Moreoever,  these data support the theoretical a rgument that group affiliation 
matters . 
In this regard, we find suggestive one difference between Latinos and 
blacks ,  on the one hand, and Asian-Ame ricans, on the other . Mernbers of the 
first two groups have entered politics as self-identified represent.atives of 
their racial o r  ethnic group and, once in office , have interacted extensively 
with caranunity leaders . Partly due to differences in residential 
concentration, Asian-American politicians rarely represent predominantly 
Asian districts and infrequently make their ethnicity central to thei r 
politics. Although causality probably goes in both directions, we suspect 
the leadership st ructures and patterns of participation are related. 
Our projection exercise suggests that the parties can play an inportant 
role in shaping the political future, Even with little change in the 
demographic characteristics of the population, successful party recruitment 
can result in significantly higher rates of activity, The consequences for 
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politics will depend upon which party gets there first. Our projections are 
not meant to imply that politics are independent of economic mobility. 
Political organization by parties, especially if it does in fact increase 
activity as we project can be a tool used to increase access of minorities to 
the fruits of economic mobility. 
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APPENDIX A: Estimations with Disaggregated Asian-American Category 
Table A. 1 Probit Estimations of Citizens' Participation on Ethnicity 
(Asian category disaggregated) 
Independent Registered Voted Contributed Worked in Contacted 
Variables in 1984 in 1984 Money Groups Media 
Latino -.56* -.59 -.26 -.32 -.07 
(.11)** (.10) (.1 1 )  (.10) (.11) 
Black . 1 1  .06 -.12 .12 -.09 
(.13) (.12) (.12) (.10) (.11) 
Chinese -.02 -.28 -.07 -.23 -.09 
(.25) (.21) (.23) (.21) (.23) 
Japanese -.47 -.28 .2 1 . 1 5  -.07 
(.20) (.19) (.19) (.18) (.20) 
Korean -.14 -. 15 .03 -.04 .01 
(.06) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.06) 
Filipino -.56 -.36 -. 10 -.08 .45 
(.25) (.25) (.27) (.24) (.24) 
Other Asian -.38 -.09 . 1 9  -. 1 8  .34 
(.34) (.34) (33) (.32) (.32) 
Constant 1 . 14 .85 -.78 -.4 1 -.77 
(.09) (.08) (.08) (.07) (.08) 
Log likelihood 
Initial -830 -830 -826 -830 -83 1  
A t  convergence -554 -677 -575 -734 -614 
N 1 197 1 198 1 19 1  1 1 97 1 199 
Percent participating 8 1  73 19 32 2 1  
* Probit coefficient 
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Table A.2 Probit Estimations of Citizens' Participation (Asian-American Category Disaggregated) Table A.3 Probit Estimations of Participation Used in Projections (Citizens Only) 
Independent Registered Voted Contributed Worked in Contacted Contacted Independent Registered Voted Contributed Worked in Contacted Contacted 
Variables in 1984 in 1984 Money Groups Media Officials Variables in 1984 in 1984 Money GrouEs Media Officials 
Latino -.10* -. 1 1  .01 -. 1 1  .02 -.28 Latino -. 1 8* -.17 .02 -.09 .03 -.30 
(.14) .. (.13) (.13) (.12) (.13) (.11) (.14)•• (.13) (.13) (.12) (.13) (.11) 
Black . 1 6  . 1 2  -.10 .02 -. 15 -.33 Black .04 .01 -. 16 .02 -. 1 8  -.40 
(.15) (.14) (.13) (.12) (.13) (.11) (.16) (.14) (.13) (.12) (.13) (.11) 
Chinese .26 -.03 -. 1 8  -.21 -. 1 1  -.38 Asian-American -.27 -.19 .07 .06 . 1 2  -.36 
(.28) (.24) (.26) (.24) (.24) (.23) (.17) (.15) (.15) (.14) (.15) (.14) 
Japanese -.59 -.43 .19 .15 -.07 -.44 
(.21) (.21) (.20) (.18) (.20) (.19) Age .030 .039 .019 .009 -.003 .013 
Korean -.04 -.05 -.00 .04 .05 -. 16 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
(.07) (.07) (.07) (.07) (.07) (.07) 65 or older -.42 -.72 -.22 -.25 .01 -.28 
Filipino -.37 -. 1 6  -.17 .08 .56 -.25 (.24) I (.21) (.17) (.16) (.18) (.16) 
(.28) (.27) (.30) (.27) (.26) (.26) Some college .64 .63 .47 .56 .44 .40 
Other Asian -.07 .23 . 1 1  -.00 .49 -.06 (.10) (.10) (.10) (.09) (.09) (.08) 
(.38) (.37) (.36) (.37) (.34) (.33) Homeowner .25 .23 .35 .12 .04 . 1 8  
(.10) (.09) (.10) (.09) (.09) (.08) 
Age .035 .040 .020 .008 -.002 .014 Head unemployed .05 -.06 -.04 .03 -.08 -.13 
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.13) (.12) (.14) (.12) (.13) (.12) 
65 or older -.49 -.75 -.21 -.24 -.01 -.31 Single mother -.01 -.26 -.35 .01 . 10 .03 
(.24) (.21) (.17) (.16) (.18) (.16) (.16) (.14) (.16) (.13) (.14) (.12) 
Some college .64 .64 .48 .57 .44 .42 Male .02 -.01 .29 .26 .09 -.01 
(.10) (.09) (.JO) (.09) (.09) (.08) (.JO) (.10) (.10) (.09) (.09) (.08) 
Homeowner .24 .23 .36 .12 .04 . 18 
(.10) (.09) (.10) (.09) (.09) (.08) Pct. life not in U.S. -.005 -.005 .002 -.006 -.003 -.003 
Head unemployed -.03 -. 1 1  -.05 .04 -.07 -.15 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
(.13) (.12) (.14) (.12) (.13) (.1 1) Non-English Jang. -.09 -.20 -.12 -.27 -.12 -.35 
Single mother -.02 -.27 -.36 .00 .09 .02 (.13) (.12) (.14) (.12) (.13) (.12) 
(.16) (.14) (.16) (.13) (.14) (.12) Ethnic problem .08 .07 .20 .40 .22 .16 
Male -.01 -.05 .27 .27 .09 -.03 (.10) (.09) (.10) (.09) (.09) (.08) 
(.10) (.09) (.10) (.09) (.09) (.08) Non-ethnic identity .42 . 1 1  .25 .33 . 1 9  .20 
(.18) (.14) (.13) (.12) (.13) (.12) 
Pct. life not in U.S. -.006 -.006 .003 -.007 -.005 -.003 
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) Strong partisan .85 .69 .26 -.09 .01 .30 
Non-English Jang. -.14 -.22 -. 1 1  -.25 -. 10 -.34 (.12) (.1 1) (.II) (.10) (,10) (.10) 
(.13) (.12) (.14) (.12) (.13) (.12) Weak partisan .44 .34 -.07 -.20 -.29 .01 
Ethnic problem .10 .08 .21 .41 .22 . 16 (.11) (.10) (.12) (.10) (.11) (.10) 
(.10) (.09) (.10) (.09) (.09) (.08) 
Non-ethnic identity .37 .08 .23 .34 . 19 . 19 Constant -.98 -1.44 -2.47 - 1 .38 -1.02 -1 .02 
(.17) (.14) (.13) (.12) (.13) (.12) (.22) (.204) (.22) (.19) (.19) (.18) 
Constant -.76 -1 .22 -2.42 -1.47 - 1 . 1 3  -.97 Log likelihood 
(.21) (.19) (.22) (.18) (.19) (.17) Initial -830 -830 -826 -830 -831 -829 
Log likelihood Convergence -453 -548 -517 -671 -588 -722 
Initial -830 -830 -826 -830 -831 -829 N 1 197 1 198 1 191 1 1 97 1 199 1 196 
At convergence -475 -567 -521 -672 -589 -728 Percent participating 8 1  73 19 3 1  2 1  37 
N 1 197 1 198 1 191 1 197 1 199 1 196 
Percent participating 81 73 19 32 21 37 
* Probit coefficient 
** Standard error of coefficient 
* Probit coefficient 
** Standard error of coefficient 
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APPENDIX B: SAMPLE DESIGN 
The major problem we faced in designing the survey was that of efficiently 
reaching large numbers of adult individuals from the three major racial and 
ethnic minorities in California--Latinos ( primarily Mexican Americans) ,  
blacks, and Asians , who, according to the 1980 Census, const ituted 19% , 8% , 
and 5% of the state population respectively . Because of the younger age 
sttucture of the groups, black and Latino percentages of adults are somewhat 
smaller than their percentages of the total population. 
Given a large enough budget , say several hundred thousand dollars ,  we 
would probably have preferred a Michigan style areal sampling framework with 
a field staff going door-to-door to interview respondents in their own 
homes. Most comparisons between in-person interviews and telephone 
interviews indicate that the former technique entails a lower refusal rate 
and less bias in the resultant sample of completed interviews . However , one 
worries how well i n-person interviews would work in neighborhoods with large 
proportions of recent Asian or Latino arrivals , as undocumented residents 
might be extremely suspicious of interviewers coming to thei r doors . 
Telephone interviews seem less obtrusive, and possibly preferable for that 
reason. The main reason we chose to do telephone interviews , however , was 
cost, as budget constraints ruled out the expense of in-person interviews . 
With telephone interviewing the most common sample selection technique is 
random digit dialing. RDD is not without problems . In many areas there 
still exists some bias resulting from the not-quite-complete saturation of 
telephone ownership. And, although we have seen no reference to this problem 
in the literature on polling , we suspect that 'an increasingly important 
source of bias here is the growing use of telephone answering machines to 
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screen incoming phone calls. More sedous, of course , i s  the unavoidable 
selection bias in any opinion survey resulting from the fact that 
participation is voluntary. The potential for biases resulting from the 
differential incidence of telephone ownership and differential refusal rates 
is l ikely to be more serious in surveys in which minority group members 
constitute a large portion of the target population. Whatever the case, the 
virtues of sampling via random digit dialing have made it the standard choice 
in telephone surveys . 
I n  large part because of its sampling virtues, however, RDD is an 
extremely inefficient method for contacting members of minority groups , at 
least in California . Ideally one could draw a sample of telephone exchanges 
via probability weights which would yield the desired minority group 
proportions . In fact, if one were interested only in oversampling blacks, 
this technique would suffice. For Latinos and for Asians, however, the high 
level of residential segregation and 
resultant strong correlation between telephone exchange areas and census 
units ( the necessary demographic data are not available for telephone 
exchanges) which is needed for this technique to be effective simply do not 
exist . This problem is bad enough for contacting Latinos, Asians, however ,  
are a n  extreme case in this regard. Of the 5050 census tracts in California 
in the 1980 Census , only 33 ( 0 , 6% )  were 40% or more Asian. Even if telephone 
exchanges could be weighted in a skewed enough fashion to increase 
significantly the probability of contacting Asian · respondents ( something of 
which we are not altogether sure) the resultant sample of Asians interviewed 
would be problematic . Most blacks live in neighborhoods which are 
predominately black. The vast majority of Asians, however ,  do not live in 
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predominately Asian neighborhoods , and so a sample based primarily on those 
who do would likely be quite unrepresentative , 
Given tQese problems , we decided that the least problematic way of 
generating the Latino and Asian subsamples would be on the basis of 
surnames. Oversampling of blacks , on the other hand , could be done on the 
basis of residence. We therefore began by randomly selecting a l ist of 300 
census tracts in California. DialArnerica Corporation of Cleveland , Ohio 
provided us with the names, current phone numbers,  and addresses of 80-100 
individuals per tract for approximately 90% of the tracts , thus yielding a 
list of 24 , 523 names . We ran these through Hispanic and Asian surname 
dictionaries, yielding subsample Ns of 3306 and 1170 , respectively. we then 
drew a 20% sample of the remaining 20 ,047 names, weighting the census tracts 
corresponding to each name so as to generate another subsample which would 
contain roughly equal proportions of whites and blacks . (We doubled the 
selection probability for tracts in which 50% or more of the residents are 
black , )  Because of this sampling procedure , we use weights on the white and 
black subsamples when calculating marginal percentages . (The weights give 
double weight to respondents residing outside the heavily black tracts but 
are adjusted to keep the total subsample n unchanged , )
As indicated earlier , one of our chief interests was to compare the 
experiences and attitudes of Asians who had recently immigrated to this 
country with those of recently arrived Latinos. In order to increase our 
sample of recent Asian immigrants , we drew a supplemental sample of Korean 
surnames from the 1984 Korean Telephone Directory of Southern California . 
The creators of this directory believe that it contains the telephone numbers 
and addresses of over 75% of all Koreans in Southern California.  We ultimately 
conducted interviews with 80 Korean Americans via this supplemental sample , 
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According to Leuthold and Scheele ( 1971) , samples which are derived from 
telephone directories will , relative to RDD , undersample blacks, individuals 
who are separated or divorced, and city dwellers . Although the percentage of 
individuals in our base sarnple of 25 , 52,3 who were Asian--4 . 8%--was almost 
identical to the 1980 Census f igures, the number of Latino names drawn was 
definitely less than that in the background population--13 . 5 % ,  cCTilpared to 
19% in the 1980 sample.  The fact that we ultimately interviewed about 25% 
more whites than blacks also suggests that there were fewer blacks i n  the 
base sanple than there should have been. 
By itself , of course, the only problem caused by this undersampling i s  
that our subsample Ns were not a s  large a s  we might have desired . A far 
greater potential problem i s  that the individuals we interviewed, regardless 
of whether they were white, black, Asian, or Latino, all had listed telephone 
numbers and addresses . This could make them somewhat unrepresentati ve sets 
of people ( less li kely to be poor, more likely to be legal resident s ) . 
As we have intimated, however ,  we were more worried about refusal rates 
than many other potential sources of bias . Given the large number of 
minority group members in our target population, we expected relatively high 
refusal rates. This in fact turned out to be the case--only 44% of the 
individuals we contacted who were eligible to be interviewed agreed to do 
so. Although we cannot be sure about the characteristics of the people who 
refused to be interviewed, it appears that refusal rates were particularly 
high among Asians and those who were likely to be black . As far as we could
tell , however ,  refusal rates were no higher among Latinos than among whites. 
Given the potential problems we faced, we were understandably interested 
in how 1;ell the characteristics of the people we interviewed matched up with 
data fro� the 1980 Census. The f igures reported in Table 1 indicate that in 
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some respects the individuals in our four subsamples were quite 
representative, while in other respects they were somewhat unrepresentative. 
In all four subsamples the reported f igures for family income and country of 
birth were quite consistent with figures derived from the 1980 Census . There 
are , however ,  some discrepancies. The percentages of blacks and Latinos in 
our sample who reported being homeowners were higher than the Census 
f igures. we also tended to oversample Asian men and black women. Reported 
education, though, was the source of the largest disc repancies. Individuals 
in all four subsamples were considerably more li kely to report having 
attended college than the 1980 census figures i ndicate should be the case. 
Howeve r ,  we are inclined to blame very little of the education bias we 
observed on our use of a telephone directory sample versus RDD. Warren 
Miller indicates that the sample of individuals interviewed in the 1984 
Michigan Rolling C ross-section ( which was a telephone survey ) had a 
considerably higher average education than those interviewed in person in the 
traditional post-election survey. 
Because participation in opinion surveys is voluntary ( at least in 
liberal democratic societies) we believe that regardless of the sarrpling 
framework employed there is an i rreducible element of self-selection bias 
generated by the differential propensity of different types of people to 
sul::mit to the interview. In political polls this self-selection bias i s  
quite naturally related t o  the extent t o  which the potential respondent is 
intellectually involved with things political--people are more likely to talk 
to strangers about subjects they care about and know something about than 
about subjects they don ' t  know about or care about . This bias will yield us 
sarrples which are, compared to the population at large, more educated, more 
literate, more interested, and more knowledgeable about ongoing political 
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issues. Any incidental bias deriving from telephone directory versus RDD 
sampli ng  was at least for us , apparently minima l .  
- 3 7  - - 38 -
TABLE B . l  Table 1 Percent Participating in Political Activities (by EUmic Group) 
COMPARISON OF SAMPLE AND CENSUS CHARACTERisrICS Non-Hispanic Asian-
Whites Blacks Latinos Americans 
Voted in 1984 
White Black Latino Asian All 76 80 44 , 48 
Citizens 80 8 1  60 69 
Percent Male Registered 
Sample 1984 49% 38% 49% 60% All 82 87 53 55 Citizens 87 88 72 77 
Census 1980 49 4 9  5 1  4 8  Contributed money 
All 20 17 1 2  1 8  
Percent OWner Occupiers Citizens 1 5  24 
Sample 1984 66 6 4  52 64 
Non-citizens 6 4 
Displayed poster/sticker 
Census 1980 62 45 4 4  62 All 8 10 10 6 
Citizens 1 1  4 
Family I ncome ( lOK Non-citizens . 9 6 
Sample 1984 12 25 21 9 Worked on campaigns 
All 6 5 3 3 
Census 1980 16 34 27 14 Citizens 4 4 
Non-citizens 1 2 
Family I ncome 10-25K 
Attended political rally 
Sample 1984 44 4 1  4 7  35 All 15 1 6  9 8 Citizens 1 2  1 1  
Census 1980 40 40 48 37 Non-citizens 3 4 
Family Income over 25K 
Contacted officials 
All 47 37 25 26 
Sample 1984 44 Citizens 29 3 1  33 32 56 Non-citizens 1 8  20 
Census 1980 44 26 25 4 9  Contacted media 
All 22 20 1 8  25 
Percent Native Born Citizens 20 25 
Non-citizens 1 1  23 sample 1984 94 98 60 38 
Worked with group to 
Census 1980 90 98 63 4 2  solve community problem 
All 33 38 1 9  24 
Percent Some College Citizens 24 32 
or Greater Non-citizens 1 1  1 1  
Sample 1984 60 53 3 4  77 Number of respondents 
All 317 335 574 308 Census 1980 44 36 20 54 Citizens 300 3 1 3  3 8 7  199 
Non-citizens 14 4 159 84 
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Table 2 Probit Estimations of Participation on Ethnicity (Citizens Only) Table 3 Distribution of Demographic and Socioeconomi c  Variables 
Independent Registered Voted Contributed Worked in Contacted Contacted 
by Ethnicity (Citizens Only)* 
Variables in 1984 in 1984 Money Groups Media Officials Non-Hispanic Asian-
Latino 
Whites Blacks Latinos Americans 
-.56* -.59 -.26 -.32 -.07 -.57 
(.11)** (.10) (.11) (.10) (.1 1 )  (.10) Mean age (years) 45 44 35 38 
Black . 1 1  .06 -.12 .12 -.09 -.27 65 or older 20 1 7  6 7 
(.13) (.12) (.12) (.10) (.11) (.10) Some college 58 57 40 77 Homeowner 64 6 1  5 8  74 
Asian-American -.41 -.35 .08 -.07 .09 -.51 Head unemployed 1 2  1 7  1 7  7 
(.13) (.12) (.13) (.12) (.13) (.12) Single mother 1 1  25 12 4 
Constant 1 .14 .85 -.78 -.41 -.77 .01 Male 48 38 46 59 
(.09) (.08) (.08) (.07) (.08) (.07) Non-English Jang. 7 2 42 37 
Log likelihood Foreign born 4 1 1 5  47 
Initial -830 -830 -826 -830 -831 -829 N 300 3 1 3  387 199 
At convergence -556 -{)78 -576 -736 -617 -771 
N 1 197 1 198 1 19 1  1 197 1 199 1 196 * All numbers arc percentages except where indicated. 
Percent participating 8 1  73 19 32 2 1  37 
* Probit coefficient 
** Standard error of coefficient 
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Table 4 Distribution of Group References by Ethnicity Table s Probit Estimations of Citizens ' Participation 
Non-Hispanic Asian- Independent Registered Voted Contributed Worked in Contacted Contacted 
Whites Blacks Latinos Americans Variables in 1984 in 1984 Money Groups Media Officials 
Percent naming a Latino -.13* -.13 .02 -. 10 .02 -.30 
racial, ethnic, or (.14)*• (.13) (.13) (.12) (. 1 2) (. II) 
nationality problem Black . 1 5  . 12 -.10 .02 -. 1 5  -.33 
Citizens 25 67 46 
(.15) (.14) (.13) (.12) (.13) (.11) 
32 Asian -.30 -.22 .04 .05 . 1 1  -.38 
Non-citizens 16 -* 50 45 (.16) (.15) (.15) (.14) (.14) (.14) 
Percent naming a Age .03 .04 .02 .01 .00 .01 
second, non-ethnic (.004) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
identity 65 or older -.44 -.72 -.23 -.25 .006 -.30 
Citizens 17 14 8 
(.23) (.21) (.17) (. 16) (.18) (.16) 
9 Some college .65 .64 .47 .56 .44 .41 
Non-citizens 24 -* 5 5 (.10) (.09) (.10) (.09) (.09) (.08) 
Homeowner .26 .24 .35 . 1 1  .03 . 1 7  
Percent with a (.09) (.09) (.IO) (.09) (.09) (.08) 
non-english Head unemployed -.03 -. 1 1  -.04 .05 -.06 -.14 
primary language (.13) (.12) (.14) (.12) (.13) (.12) 
Citizens 7 2 42 37 
Single mother -.03 -.27 -.35 .01 .09 .02 
(.16) (.14) (.16) (.13) (.14) (.12) 
Non-citizens 52 -* 88 86 Male -.02 -.05 .28 .27 . 1 0  -.02 
(.IO) (.09) (.IO) (.09) (.IO) (.08) 
* insufficient cases Pct. life not in U.S. -.005 -.005 .002 -.006 -.003 -.003 
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
Non-English Jang. -. 1 1  -.20 -.12 -.26 -. 1 1  -.35 
(.13) (.12) (.14) (.12) (.13) (.12) 
Ethnic problem .12 .09 .20 .40 .22 . 1 6  
(.10) (.09) (.10) (.09) (.09) (.08) 
Non-ethnic identity .37 .08 .23 .34 . 1 9  . 19 
(.17) (.14) (.13) (.12) (.13) (.12) 
Constant -.70 -1 .20 -2.44 - 1.47 -1.13 -.98 
(.21) (.19) (.22) (.18) (.19) (.17) 
Log likelihood 
Initial -830 -830 -826 -830 -831 -829 
At convergence --478 -569 -522 -673 -593 -729 
N 1 197 1 198 1 19 1  1 197 1 199 1 196 
Percent participating 8 1  7 3  19 3 1  2 1  37 
* Probit coefficient 
** Standard error of coefficient 
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Table 6 Probit Estimations of Non-Citizens' Participation Table 7 Projected Participation Rates of Citizens under Various Scenarios 
Independent Worked in Contacted Contacted 
(by Ethnicity) 
Variables Groups Media Officials Current Scenario 
Rates I. II. III. IV. v. 
Age -.006* -.015 -.015 
(.010)** (.009) (.Oil')) Register 
Some college . 19 . 1 8  .04 Non-Hispanic Whites 87 90 
(.23) (.21) (.19) 
Head unemployed -.49 -.27 -. 19 Blacks 88 88 88 
(.33) (.27) (.24) 
Male .12 . 1 4  . 1 6  Latinos 72 81 78 76 86 85 
(.24) (.21) (.20) 
Asian-Americans 77 85 84 90 
Pct. life in U.S. .008 .009 .005 
(.005) (.004) (.004) Vote 
Non-English Jang. . 12 -.60 -.21 Non-Hispanic Whites 80 84 
(.35) (.26) (.27) 
Ethnic problem .78 . 19 .33 Blacks 8 1  82 82 
(.24) (.21) (.19) 
Linked to country of origin . 19 -.58 -.29 Latinos 60 74 66 65 79 78 
(.38) (.29) (.29) 
Asian-Americans 69 77 76 83 
Constant -2. 1 6  -.10 -.44 
(.71) (.49) (.50) Contact Officials 
Log likelihood Non-Hispanic Whites 47 
Initial -180 -180 - 1 79 
At convergence -78 -97 - 1 15 B lacks 37 37 38 
N 259 259 258 
Percent participating 1 1  15 18 Latinos 29 37 32 32 40 4 1  
* Probit coefficient 
Asian-Americans 3 1  40 34 43 
** . Standard error of coefficient Work in Groups 
Non-Hispanic Whites 33 
Blacks 38 
Latinos 24 30 28 34 
Asian-Americans 32 42 
I. Americanization (Aging, Language) 
II. Party Recruitment 
III. Socio-Economic Mobility 
IV. Americanization and Party Recruitment 
v. Americanization and Socio-Economic Mobility 
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1 .  I n  another paper w e  take u p  the question o f  similarities and 
differences in issue preferences, 
2 .  In t he  1980 National Election study, 1 4 7  black respondents but only 
4 8  Latinos reached the turnout questions in the interview; in 1984 the 
numbers were higher but too low still for detailed analysis ( 115 Latinos and 
222 blacks). OVersanpling has been used at times to increase the number of 
black respondents, alth;)ugh rarely for the other groups. Analyses based upon 
Census dat a ,  like Wolfinger and Rosenstone ( 1980) , have sUfficient numbers of 
respondents but a very limited set of political variables. Studies which 
target particular communities can by appropriate selection of sites capture 
large numbers of minority respondents (Bro�'rr'.. ng, Marshall, and Tabb ( 1984 ) is 
one of the best such studies ) ;  the admirable depth gained in such studies 
canes at some c ost in generalizability. 
3 .  One consequence of the design is that the sanple is not 
representative of the state population, per se . Thus , frequencies can only 
be interpreted within each of the four sarrpled gr�Jps, 
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4 .  For discussions of the definition of political participat ion, see 
Verba and Nie, 197 2 ,  p. 2 and Geraint Parry, 197 2 1  pp . 18-31 , 
5 .  The high reported black turnout reflects the abnormally high 
education and income levels of our black sar.;;le, Sample and census 
characteristics for the other groups match better. (See Appendix B, Table 
B, l. ) In addi tion, some evidence indicates that blacks tend to over-report 
their voting (Abramson and Claggett, 1984 , 1986 ) . 
6 ,  We made n o  attenpt t o  determine which o f  our respondents were 
undocumented alien residents; such a question would quickly have terminated 
interview. we presume that our sanple tends toward legal, documented aliens, 
as they are more likely to have listed telephone numbers and to be willing t o  
give an interview, 
7 .  Unfortunately, we did not establish which media, Other aspects of 
our analysis suggest that these people are probably expressing opinions in 
t he  ethnic press, which is well-developed in certain Asian-American ccrranunities. 
8 ,  other theorists focus upon the structural factors which facilitate 
or impede participation, In rational actor terms, these factors are 
conponents of the cost term, Burnham ( 1970, pp . 71-90) points to the 
introduction of registration, literacy requirements, and nonpartisan ballots 
to account for long-term changes in turnout. Wolfinger and Rosenstone ( 1980, 
pp. 61-89) have carefully analyzed the contenporary effect of different 
states' registration requirements upon levels of voting. These effects are 
clearly important, but provide little leverage here, as we deal with only one 
time point within one state, 
9 .  The one major variable suggested by the rational actor tradition' 
which we omit i s  perceived closeness of an election outcome. Despite its 
theoretical plausibility, "closeness" has performed only weakly i n  empirical 
analyses . See Foster ( 1984 )  for a review of the studies and Grofman ( 1 983)  
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and Uhlaner and Grofman ( 1986 ) for a discussion of the difficulties in using 
measures of closeness .  
10 . Other theorists have managed to produce a prediction of activity; 
Ledyard ( 1981, 198 4 )  uses a general equilibrium approach, while Ferejohn and 
Fiorina ( 1974 , 1975 ) posit minimax-reg ret rationality. Ledyard ' s  solution 
breaks down in la rge electorates, Mimimax-regret has not been enbraced by 
other theorists as the solution. 
1 1 .  The following argument ha s  been developed in considerably more 
detail elsewhere by one of the authors ( Uhlaner , 1980 , 1986a , 1986b) . 
1 2 .  This argument rests upon the ex istence o f  g roup affiliations, and 
depends, in the argument about normative benefits, upon people caring about 
maintaining their group affiliation, These issues are addressed, and 
"relational goods" proposed as part of a solution, in Uhlaner, 1986b, 
13. Our approach differs f rom that of the NES. The 1984 studies asked : 
"Sometimes people think about other groups of people in society when they 
think about their own economic well-being , people who are being helped or 
hurt by economic conditions. When it comes to economic matters, what groups 
of people do � feel closest to? ( IF R OOESN ' T  KNOO WHAT WE MEAN BY 
"GROUPS" : Some people have mentioned farmers, the elderly, teachers , blacks ,  
and union members . ) " The pre/post study also repeated the by-now standard 
group identification items : "Here is a list of groups . Please read over the 
list and tell me the letter for those groups you feel particularly close to 
� people who a re most like you in their ideas and interests and feelings 
about things" followed by : "Look at the list again. Of the groups you just 
mentioned, which one do you feel closest to?" The new item asks about 
identif ication with respect to the economic sphere, which may or may not be 
the one most salient to respondents.  Thi rty percent of respondents reply 
"poor , "  "middle class , "  or "working class . "  The old item focuses on 
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subjective similarity and has consistently yielded significant numbers of men 
identifying with women, whites with blacks, young with elderly, and so 
forth. our item has a more specifically poli tical referent than the old NES 
item, but a broader one ( not restricted to economics ) than the new one . We 
also used various other items in some of the estimations, such as perception 
of one' s  group as relatively disadvantaged or as discriminated against; 
results were not substantially different. 
1 4 .  To take another exanple, census enumeration can strengthen ethnic 
and racial identity, Latino leaders lol:hied very hard for a special category 
designated " Hispanics" in the 1980 census so that Latinos would get their 
"fair" share of federal program allocations and district boundaries that more 
fai rly reflected their potential political strength .  
15 . For education, we did a number of estimations using years of 
schooling , but found that most of the play came from the spli t  between those 
who had no college education and those who had at least some . We thus use a 
dummy variable coded 1 for those who have at least some college education; 
one advantage of using such a dummy is that we need not assume a linear 
effect from years of schooling . 
16.  We ran some estimations separately for each ethnic group , thereby 
permitting coefficients to vary between the groups. The most interesting 
findings from these estimations concern gender; for most activities, black 
women are more active than black men, while Latino and Asian men a re more 
active than women of the same ethnicity. These gender effects are 
reassuringly consistent with our other i nformation on the culture of the 
groups in question. One other finding has no obvious explanation; education, 
measured as years in school , had negligible effects upon Asian participation 
rates. 
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17 . That i s ,  we see the negative age coefficient as supporting
Converse ' s  ( 196 9 )  a rgurrent about increased resistance to learning as people 
age ,  Black , Niemi , and Powell ( forthccming ) ,  however, get contradictory 
results with a sarrple of Toronto irrrnigrants .  
18 , For exarrple, currently thi rty percent fewer Asians than blacks 
identify strongly with a political party. The probi t coefficient on strong 
pa rtisanship in the estimation of registration is . 85 .  I f  strong 
partisanship among Asians increases by , 30 ,  . 26 ( , 85 x . 30 )  will be added to 
the estimated probit value. As 77 percent of Asian citizens are currently 
registered, the g roup begins , 74 of a standard deviation above the normal 
distribution mean. Moving from . 74 to 1 . 00 corresponds to an increase of .07 
in area under the curve , or an i ncrease of 7 percent in persons registered. 
Thus, we would project that if as many Asians become strong partisans as is 
currently the case among blacks, then Asian reg istration rates would increase 
from 77 percent to 84 percent. 
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